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REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE: AN




In 1980, Congress, in adopting the recommendations of the
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU"), made it clear the Copyright Act protects computer programs.'
By ensuring copyright protection extended to computer software, Congress
encouraged creative contributions in software by awarding authors certain
exclusive rights to their works.
"Author reward," however, is not the only policy copyright law
seeks to promote. The Supreme Court has stated that "the primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."2  To further the
primary goal of copyright law, "copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely on the ideas and
information conveyed by a work .... The result is neither unfair, nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art."
3
* Associate Attorney, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, LLP, Houston, Texas.
1. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir.
1983) (discussing Congress' adoption of CONTU's recommendations, which made "it explicit
that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper
subject matter of copyright"); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "computer program").
Under § 102, Congress considers computer programs to be a subset of "literary works." See H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976).
2. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art I, §8, cl.8).
3. Id. at 349-50; see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989). The Patent and Copyright clause "reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' Id.; see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating determination of the scope of limited monopolies
granted to authors or inventors "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
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The copyright policies of "author reward" and "idea dissemination"
will likely clash where it is unclear whether subject matter ostensibly
appropriated by another is protectable or whether it contains both
protectable and unprotectable elements. A technological practice that
brings this conflict to a head is the reverse engineering of software, which
involves working backward from a finished software program to determine
how the program operates. In contexts outside of copyright law, the
Supreme Court has noted reverse engineering is not necessarily a
subversive and disfavored practice.4 Rather, it is a practice that can serve
the public by providing access to information. Indeed, Congress has
expressly approved the practice of reverse engineering in other
technological contexts, such as the development of mask works for
semiconductor chips.6  On the other hand, the Copyright Act does not
clearly legitimize the reverse engineering of software.
The Copyright Act raises significant questions for reverse engineers:
how can the reverse engineer safely and freely build on ideas and
information conveyed by another's software? Will the reverse engineer run
afoul of another author's copyright "reward," and if so, what potential
liabilities will arise? How can these actions be defended, thereby
promoting the dissemination of ideas and the financial well-being of the
reverse engineer?
This Article suggests the proper analysis for determining the legality
of the reverse engineering of software. The Article concludes although
reverse engineers of software are usually copyright infringers, they may be
able to escape liability for infringement by employing a number of
defensive measures. However, in many instances, even if reverse engineers
manage to escape liability under the Copyright Act, they may remain liable
under state law for breach of license, or under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information and commerce on the other
hand...").
4. See Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Reverse
engineering of a trade secret is a "fair and honest means... [of] starting with the known product
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture." Id;
see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160 ("Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles
in the public domain often leads to significant advances in technology.").
5. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1994).
7. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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II. REVERSE ENGINEERING AND THE INTERMEDIATE COPYIST
Reverse engineering involves starting with a finished software
program and working backward to analyze how the program operates.
Because a finished software program is distributed in the form of object
(binary) code,8 it must be disassembled or decompiled in order to transform
the object code into a language humans can read, such as BASIC or C+. 9
Once the code is transformed, the reverse engineer can analyze the
structure of the program and put the information to a variety of uses.' 0
Commentators have noted the reverse engineering of software
encompasses a diverse range of activities undertaken for an equally diverse
range of purposes." However, this Article focuses on the making of an
intermediate copy1 2 of an original software work for the purpose of
developing a new software product that otherwise does not infringe the
original work. 13 This intermediate copy can be as innocuous as loading the
8. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Computer
programs... are typically distributed for public use in object code form, embedded in a silicon
chip or on a floppy disk.").
9. See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE:
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 125-58 (1992); Andy Johnson-Laird, Technical Demonstration of Decompilation,
Address, in COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE: DERIVATIVE WORKS AND REVERSE
ENGINEERING, 361-87 (1992).
10. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE:
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 148 (1992).
I1. See generally G. Gervaise Davis III, Scope of Protection of Computer-Based Works:
Reverse Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, in 370 COMPUTER L. INST., 115, 142-43
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Practice Course Handbook Series
No. G-370, 1993) (listing teaching, writing, debugging, emulation, modification, achieving
interoperability and developing competitive replacements as various rationales for reverse
engineering).
12. Reverse engineering may require the making of an intermediate copy of a software
program. "Intermediate copies may include 'the computer file generated by the disassembly
program, the printouts of the disassembled code, and the computer files containing . . .
modifications of the code that were generated during the reverse engineering process."' John G.
Mills, Possible Defenses to Complaints for Copyright Infringement and Reverse Engineering of
Computer Software: Implications for Antitrust and LP. Law, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 101, 106 (1998) (citation omitted).
13. A reverse engineer who produces an infringing work--one that is substantially similar
to the infringed work-will face a relatively straightforward copyright infringement analysis. In
such a case, reverse engineering would be relevant in determining whether the infringer had
"access" to the infringed work. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The plaintiff may prove defendant's copying either by direct evidence
or, as is most often the case, by showing that (1) the defendant had access to the plaintiff's
copyrighted work and (2) that defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's
copyrightable material."). Furthermore, this Article does not address those forms of reverse
2000]
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object code of the original software into the Random-Access-Memory
"(RAM)" of the computer being used for analysis 14 or by the creation of a
disassembled version of the object code. 
15
Holding an intermediate copyist liable for copyright infringement in
the course of producing an otherwise non-infringing work may seem
counterintuitive or simply unfair. In practice, it is therefore not surprising
that an analysis of the infringement liability of the intermediate copyist is
colored by considerations of copyright policy and fairness. This analysis
takes account of the fact the reverse engineer is generally not a "free rider,"
but has likely put considerable effort into developing their work.'
6
III. INTERMEDIATE COPYISTS ARE LIKELY INFRINGERS
A person who reverse engineers a piece of software will almost
certainly infringe the copyright in that software through the creation of an
intermediate copy of the work.' 7 Because the object code and source code
of a computer program are protectable forms of expression, 8 their
reproduction is a direct infringement of the author's exclusive right of
reproduction. 19
A. The Application ofAbstraction-Filtration-Comparison Reveals an
Intermediate Copyist Will Likely Appropriate Protectable Expression
Implicit in the conclusion that intermediate copyists are copyright
infringers is the assumption the copied software program embodies
20 iprotectable subject matter. It is well established that copyright law
engineering that involve monitoring the operation of an original software work or otherwise do
not involve direct reproduction of the work under analysis.
14. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,518(9th Cir. 1993).
15. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525 ("[D]isassembly is wholesale copying.").
16. Davis, supra note 11, at 122. Reverse engineering "is not a free ride for the second
program author, who must develop her own functionally compatible program without using the
protected expression of the first author." Id.
17. See Mills, supra note 12, at 106. The reverse engineering process requires a reverse
engineer to copy an original computer program "either by loading the program into computer
memory or copying the program to other media such as a printer or display for further study.
This unauthorized act of copying violates one of the bundle of rights conveyed on the copyright
holder under 17 U.S.C. § 106." Id.
18. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir.
1983) ("[A] computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a 'literary work' and is
protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or source code version.").
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
20. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir.
2000) ("Coyrighted software ordinarily contains both copyrighted and unprotected or functional
elements.").
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protects only an author's expression, and not "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery.' 2' Even the
otherwise protectable expression of an idea will be precluded from
copyright protection under the doctrine of "merger,, 22 which occurs when
ideas can be expressed in only a limited number of ways. 23  Moreover,
expressions that are standard, stock or common in a particular trade are
unprotectable as "scenes t faire.24  Functional elements are similarly
excluded from protection,25 as is factual material.26 Works that do not meet
the originality requirement of § 102(a)27 also do not qualify for protection.
Finally, subject matter in the public domain is free for the taking and is not
protectable by copyright.28 These limitations bear heavily on the
determination of the protectability of utilitarian articles, such as software,
that "combine[] creative and technical expression. 29  While these
limitations do not eviscerate the protection provided to software under the
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
22. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Morrissey
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cit. 1967)).
23. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
24. See Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992).
Programmers are often restricted by such considerations as 1) the mechanical specifications of the
computer on which a particular program is intended to run; 2) compatibility requirements of other
programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; 3) computer
manufacturers' design standards; 4) demands of the industry being serviced; and 5) widely
accepted programming practices within the computer industry. Id. at 709-10 (citation omitted).
25. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1547 (11th Cir. 1996) ("External
considerations such as compatibility may negate a finding of infringement."). In a footnote, the
court explained whether external considerations can negate a finding of infringement depends on
the specific facts of a given case. As a result, the court declined to create a bright-line rule.
However, the court went on to state "[i]n no case ... should copyright protection be extended to
functional results obtained when program instructions are executed and such results are processes
of the type better left to patent and trade secret protection." Id. at 1547 n.33.
26. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991)
(noting facts are not copyrightable, but compilations of facts are copyrightable if their selection,
coordination, or arrangement in the compilation involves sufficient originality).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .. ") (emphasis added); see also Toro,
787 F.2d at 1216 (holding plaintiffs equipment part numbers lacked sufficient originality to
warrant copyright protection). "The arbitrary assignment of randomly chosen numbers to a
particular replacement part does not evince enough authorship for copyright protection." Id.; see
also Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Toro in support of
its holding plaintiff's three or four digit command codes were not sufficiently original to warrant
copyright protection).
28. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
29. Id. at 704 (citations omitted); see also Sony Computer, 203 F.3d at 603 ("[Iln the case
of computer programs, [the] idea/expression distinction poses 'unique problems' because
computer programs are 'in essence, utilitarian articles-articles that accomplish tasks."').
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Copyright Act, they make it difficult to draw a line between what is
protectable and what is not in a given piece of software.
The leading approach for determining the scope of protection for a
particular software program is the three-part "abstraction-filtration-
comparison" test, first announced by the Second Circuit in Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.30  First, the "abstraction" step
characterizes the program at increasing levels of generality, from the object
code to the flow of the program and eventually to the program's very
theme. Second, the "filtration" step applies the foregoing limitations on the
subject matter of copyright to whittle away the unprotectable elements
from each level of abstraction. Together, these first two steps define what
is protectable in the copied software. 31  Finally, the "comparison" step
contrasts protectable elements of the copied work from the alleged
infringing work to determine if the two are substantially similar. If
substantial similarity exists, the copied work has been infringed.32
Notably, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test was designed
specifically to address non-literal infringement, i.e., infringment of those
aspects of computer programs that are not reduced to written code.33 The
Computer Associates court took for granted "the literal elements of
computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of
copyright protection." 34  Other courts have worked literal elements into
their analyses of protectable subject matter, perhaps recognizing literal
expression may contain unprotectable elements in need of filtration.3' For
30. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
31. See id. at 710 (explaining abstraction and filtration reveal the "core of protectable
expression. In terms of a work's copyright value, this is the golden nugget").
32. The abstraction-filtration-comparison was born out of case law not involving software.
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.). In Nichols,
the court stated:
Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be
no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of
his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id. Thus, it is not surprising that some courts have applied this test in contexts outside of
copyright infringement of software. See, e.g., Country Kids N' City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d
1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to assess the
infringement of plaintiff's wooden dolls).
33. See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 ("[T]his case deals with the challenging
question of whether and to what extent the 'non-literal' aspects of a computer program, that is,
those aspects that are not reduced to written code, are protected by copyright.").
34. Id. at 702.
35. See Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1545 ("Since the district court instructed the jury that Altai
filtration was limited to nonliteral copying, the jury must have concluded that any instances of
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example, in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries,36 the Tenth
Circuit suggested "a computer program can often be parsed into at least six
levels of generality declining abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the
program structure or architecture, (iii) modules, (iv) algorithms and data
structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code. 37 More importantly, the
court noted a computer program's literal elements are less likely to contain
unprotectable elements and will therefore "almost always be found to be
protectable expression unless the doctrine of merger and scenes d faire
come into play."
38
When the mechanics of reverse engineering are considered in light of
the foregoing considerations, it becomes clear that software copied by the
intermediate copyist will likely contain protectable subject matter. For
example, the intermediate copyist will probably copy the literal elements of
a program verbatim by loading object code into RAM or by decompiling
the object code into source code. Therefore, the Gates Rubber court
correctly noted the copying of a program's literal elements will most likely
constitute infringement, given the likelihood such elements contain
protectable expression. This is true even if the amount of protectable
expression is small and, consequently, the copyright is "thin., 39 Given the
technical characteristics of software and the current status of the case law,
it is exceedingly difficult for an intermediate copyist to study an original
software work without creating a copy of the work,4° thereby infringing at
least some "nugget" of protected expression. Moreover, no express
literal copying .. .were by definition acts of copyright infringement. This conclusion is a
manifest distortion and misstatement of the law.").
36. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
37. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 836.
39. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995)
("Because Southeastern's service activities involved copying entire programs, there is no doubt
that protected elements of the software were copied.") (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.
977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993)); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832,
840 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Even for works warranting little copyright protection, verbatim copying is
infringement.") (citations omitted); Richard Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New
Technology, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1229, 1239 (1985) ("When a defendant's computer program
contains code that is an exact copy of or quite close to an exact copy of the code in a plaintiff's
copyrighted computer program, the defendant will almost surely be held liable to the plaintiff for
copyright infringement."); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991) (noting "copyright in a factual compilation is [inevitably] thin," because only the
selection and arrangement of the facts in a compilation is expression entitled to protection under
the Copyright Act).
40. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAw 530 (3d ed. 1994) ("The problems posed
by [intermediate] copying are particularly difficult in the context of computer software copyright,
because it may be hard to analyze the unprotected features of a copyrighted program by other
means.").
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provision of the Copyright Act clearly legitimizes the activities of the
intermediate copyist.
4'
At least one court has taken the conclusion that intermediate copying
is likely an infringement to an extreme. In Sony Computer Entertainment,
Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,42 the district court, in a decision later reversed on
other grounds,43 held the intermediate copying of software is per se
infringement. In Sony, defendant Connectix built an emulator that allowed
its customers to play Sony's video game cartridges on their personal
computers. 44 To build the emulator, Connectix had to make a copy of the
Basic Input/Output System BIOS code in Sony's PlayStation game
console.45 Connectix first downloaded a copy of the BIOS code from the
Internet. 46 After discovering the downloaded BIOS code was the wrong
version, Connectix dismantled a Sony PlayStation console, removed the
BIOS chip, and downloaded the PlayStation code onto its own computers.47
After studying Sony's BIOS code, Connectix eventually developed its own
code for use in its emulator.48 Sony alleged the intermediate copying of its
BIOS code was an infringement and requested a preliminary injunction .49
The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding Sony
would likely prevail on the merits of its copyright infringement claim at
trial. 50 The court cited MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.5 and
Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.52 in rejecting Connectix's
argument that Sony had not met its initial burden of showing, through a
"filtration analysis," its BIOS code was entitled to copyright protection.
The district court indicated in MAI Systems, a filtration analysis was not
necessary "because the entire copyrighted operating system had been used
41. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
the Copyright Act does not provide a "per se exemption to section 106 for disassembly...").
42. 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 596, 608 (9th
Cir. 2000).
43. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that Connectix's
intermediate copying had not been a fair use. See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d at 608; see also infra Part IV.A. Connectix did not contest that it had
copied on appeal.
44. See id. at 1215.
45. See id. at 1215-16.
46. See id.
47. Seeid. at 1216.
48. See id.
49. See Sony Computer, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
50. See id. at 1224.
51. 991 F.2d 511 (9thCir. 1993).
52. 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
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in the accused's computer., 53 Furthermore, the Sony Computer court relied
on Triad Systems, stating "[i]n the wholesale copying of a copyrighted
operating system, a filtration analysis is not necessary."
54
The court's decision in Sony Computer and the Ninth Circuit cases
upon which it relies are questionable. While it is likely the copyright
holder can show the appropriation of some nugget of protected expression,
such a result should not be preordained. Not all copied software will
contain protectable expression, particularly if the amount copied is
relatively small or if other limitations on the subject matter of copyright,
such as merger or functionality, apply in a given case.55 Courts would
therefore be wise not to follow the assumption of the district court in Sony
Computer that wholesale copying of another's computer program
necessarily constitutes infringement. The copyright holder should first be
required, through abstraction and filtration, to establish the copied work
contains some protectable expression. To require any less is to run the risk
that subject matter other than protectable expression is retracted from the
public domain and inadvertently protected by copyright.
B. Some Courts Have Applied an Erroneous Analysis When Assessing
Whether Intermediate Copying Constitutes Infringement
Some courts have declined to hold intermediate copyists liable under
the Copyright Act when they have not marketed an otherwise infringing
product. These courts have failed to apply the Copyright Act according to
its terms, and perhaps these courts have overlooked the fact the
reproduction right of § 106(1) is separate and distinct from the distribution
right of § 106(3). In a typical copyright infringement case, the infringer
violates both of these rights by making and marketing an infringing copy.
5 6
By contrast, the intermediate copyist infringes only the reproduction
right,57 but this infringement is not rendered ineffectual by the absence of
the infringement on the distribution right.
In the case of Walker v. University Books, Inc.,58 the defendants made
blueprints of plaintiffs "I Ching" cards as an intermediate step in making
their own cards. The court noted even an "inchoate representation of some
final product to be marketed commercially" may constitute an
53. Sony Computer, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
56. See JOYCE, supra note 40, at 499.
57. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
58. 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979).
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infringement. 59 It was no defense that defendants used the blueprints "as
merely a step in the manufacture of their [own] cards." 60 The issue was
whether they utilized the plaintiffs work without authorization in the
manufacture of their product.6' The fact the defendant's copy was in a
different medium and the blueprints were never sold did not preclude an
infringement of copyright.62
Courts have correctly applied the principle of Walker by holding
intermediate copyists of software to be infringers. 63 For example, the Ninth
Circuit, in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.,64 addressed whether
Accolade had infringed copyrights in Sega's game cartridges by making
intermediate copies of them for the purpose of determining how they
interacted with Sega's game console. The court concluded the
reproduction right of § 106(1) "[o]n its face . . . unambiguously
encompasses and proscribes 'intermediate copying."' 65  In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted a copy, for purposes of the Copyright Act,
"must be fixed in some tangible form 'from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device."' 66  After finding Accolade's various
computer files and printouts of Sega's code met this definition, the court
concluded Accolade's activities fell "squarely within the category of facts
that are prohibited by the statute., 67 Importantly, the court also recognized
"intermediate copying of computer object code may infringe the exclusive
rights granted to the copyright owner in § 106 of the Copyright Act
59. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Walt
Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding copyright
"prohibits the creation of copies, even if the creator considers those copies mere interim steps
toward some final goal" and even if those copies are not distributed).
60. Walker, 602 F.2d at 864.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450
(D. Idaho 1983). In Hubco, the defendant discovered how to modify the plaintiff's operating
software to make it run faster. This involved the intermediate step of either making a printout of
or copy of the operating software within the machine being upgraded. At the preliminary
injunction stage the court held that plaintiff had shown a reasonable likelihood that either of the
defendant's methods infringed the plaintiff's reproduction right. Id. at 456. The court's holding
was apparently limited to adjudging the propriety of making the intermediate copy, and not the
propriety of the final "modified" version of the program (which might constitute, at least, an
infringing derivative work). Id. As such, the facts of Hubco provide a good example of the
potential liability faced by the intermediate copyist. See S & H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., 568
F. Supp. 416, 422 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
64. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
65. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id.
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regardless of whether the end product of the copying also infringes those
rights.
68
The Sega court acknowledged not all courts have assessed
intermediate copying of software in light of the "unambiguous language"
of the Copyright Act.69 For example, in NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.,70 the
district court, in dicta, opined it was improper to adjudge infringement of
intermediate copies. Instead, the court stated the proper focus should be on
the end product the intermediate copyist ultimately commercialized. 7' The
court relied on See v. Durang72 to conclude that because the version of the
microsequence NEC marketed had been substantially changed from the
version it had allegedly copied, there remained "no basis for a claim of
copying or even of substantial similarity. 73 The court also quoted Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co.,74 stating "a defendant may legitimately
avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work
which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the
plaintiff.,
75
The district court in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America
76
expressed a similar view:
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted,
and analyzed plaintiffs code does not, in and of itself, establish
pirating. As both parties' witnesses admitted, dumping and
analyzing competitors' codes is a standard practice in the
industry. Had Uniden contented itself with surveying the
general outline of the EFJ program, thereafter converting the
scheme into detailed code through its own imagination,
creativity, and independent thought, a claim of infringement
would not have arisen."
68. Id. at 1519 (emphasis added).
69. Cf id. (noting, however, a "close reading of those cases ... reveals that in none of
them was the legality of intermediate copying at issue").
70. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
71. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("It should...
be noted that [NEC's designer] changed his RESET sequence substantially in writing Rev. 2,
which is NEC's final version of the challenged microcode and thus the only one against which a
claim of infringement may be directed.").
72. 711 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983).
73. NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1186-87 (citations omitted).
74. 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982).
76. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
77. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485, 1501 n.17 (D. Minn.
1985); see also Stephen J. Davidson, Exploring Tensions Between Copyright Law and
Competition, 14 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 6 (1997) (approving of the Uniden approach). Compare
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The "ends justifies the means" rationale of NEC and E.F. Johnson
departs from the proper analysis established for determining copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act. Standard industry practices, found
compelling in E.F. Johnson, do not trump the reproduction right of the
Copyright Act, and the logic employed in NEC--"[c]opying [which is]
deleted or disguised ... is not copying"78-is simply false on its face.
Copying is a violation of the right of reproduction unless the Copyright Act
dictates otherwise, and the Copyright Act contains no exception for
copying which is deleted or disguised.79 Moreover, the cases relied on by
the NEC court, Durang and Eden Toys are not on point to the issue of
intermediate copying. In both cases, the plaintiff alleged only the
commercialized versions of the defendants' works were infringements, and
did not challenge the acts of intermediate copying as infringements.80
Therefore, these cases do not stand for the proposition that intermediate
-copying is permissible if the commercialized version of defendant's
product is otherwise noninfringing; they simply do not address the issue.
However, these cases should remind practitioners of an important
principle: if one wishes to challenge the creation of an intermediate copy
as an infringement, one should challenge it as a violation of the
reproduction right.8' If one wishes to additionally challenge the
Davis, supra note 11, at 141 ("[m]ost reverse engineering issues arise because the parties or the
courts fail to distinguish between the act of reverse engineering and the similarities of expression
found in the final work products. The focus must be on the substantial similarity of the
expression in the final work, and not the means by which the author got there.") (emphasis
omitted), with Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The Atari court stated:
The district court assumed that reverse engineering (intermediate copying) was
copyright infringement. This court disagrees. Atari did not violate Nintendo's
copyright by deprocessing computer chips in Atari's rightful possession. Atari
could lawfully deprocess Nintendo's iONES chips to learn their unprotected ideas
and processes. This fair use did not give Atari more than the right to understand the
1 ONES program and to distinguish the protected from the unprotected elements of
the iONES program. Any copying beyond that necessary to understand the lONES
program was infringement.
Id. (emphasis added). While the emphasized sentences seem contrary to Sega and consistent
with NEC and Uniden, a closer analysis of the opinion reveals the court's determination of "no
infringement" was coextensive with its finding of fair use. Therefore, the author submits this
decision implicitly concludes the intermediate copying was an infringement, but excusable as fair
use. See infra Part W.A.
78. NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1187 (quoting Durang, 711 F.2d. at 142.
79. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
80. See generally Durang, 711 F.2d 141; Eden Toys, 675 F.2d 498.
81. An interesting question is whether the successful assertion of intermediate copying as
an infringement entitles the holder of the right to an injunction against the defendant if
noninfringing works were created with knowledge gained from the plaintiff's work. The answer
to this question starts with § 502(a) of the Copyright Act, which states a court may issue
preliminary and permanent injunctions "on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
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commercialization of an end product as an infringement, one should
challenge it separately as a violation of the distribution right.
C. The Inherent Dirtiness of Software "Clean Room " Procedures
An interesting and related inquiry concerning an intermediate
copyist's status as an infringer is the impact of "clean room" procedures.
Generally, the clean room procedure is a method of reverse engineering a
software program in a manner which purportedly reduces the reverse
engineer's copyright liability. 2 It generally works by splitting reverse
engineering efforts between two isolated groups. The first group reverse
engineers the program to understand the ideas within, and the second uses
those ideas, detailed in a written journal or log, in the development of an
restrain infringement of a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). A recent case interpreting an
analogous provision in the patent statute suggests an injunction is proper only to enjoin activities
that have infringed a patent or are likely to do so, and an injunction is not proper as either a
remedial measure for past infringement or as a punitive measure. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
CellPro Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994)
(prescribing that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable"). Thus, patent law suggests a court may not enjoin the noninfringing fruits that have
stemmed from the intermediate copyist's infringement, and the holder of the right must instead
satisfy himself with monetary damages pursuant to § 502(a), under the "prevent or restrain
infringement" language of the statute. See 17 U.S.C. §502(a).
However, not all courts have agreed. For example, the district court in Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., in issuing a blanket injunction, reasoned as follows:
While it is undisputed that [Connectix's commercialized end product] does not
contain any copyrighted material, in a copyright infringement claim based on in-
termediate infringement, the composition of the end product is not the sole test.
The infringing conduct is based on how the end product was developed. Here, the
evidence is clear that Connectix unlawfully copied and used Sony's BIOS to de-
velop its [end product]. Thus, the only effective remedy for such intermediate in-
fringement is to enjoin the end product. If not, an intermediate infringer could al-
ways avoid the consequences of illegal copying and use by editing the protected
code out of its final product.
Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (N.D. Cal.
1999), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). In contrast to Sony Computer, other
courts have suggested only an infringing end product may be enjoined. For example, in Kepner-
Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994), the defendant appealed the
district court's order enjoining not only its infringing product, but also "all future modifications
and improvements." Id. at 538. The Fifth Circuit rejected the latter part of the injunction,
reasoning that "the most [the district court] could enjoin were future modifications and
improvements of [the defendant's product] that are substantially similar to [the plaintiff's]
copyrighted Materials." Id.; see also Sony Computer, 203 F.3d 596, 608 n. I (noting, in dictum,
intermediate copying did not warrant the issuance of an injunction if the marketed product did not
itself constitute an infringement).
82. But see Davis, supra note 11, at 151. Cf NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1188 (discussing
defendant's use of a clean room procedure to prove that plaintiffs code was dictated by
functional concerns and therefore, not protectable under copyright).
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end product. The second group has no direct access to the expression
embodied in the program examined by the first group.83
This process helps to ensure the end product is sufficiently different
to avoid infringement upon the original program.84 However, the clean
room process does not completely absolve the reverse engineering team
from infringement because those in the first group have likely made copies
of protectable expression through their decompilation effort. 8' The first
team, like the intermediate copyist more generally, faces "the seemingly
impossible task of dealing with a copyrighted work, which he needs to read
in order to understand its ideas, but which he cannot read without
copying."86  Thus, the clean room process is not the panacea some
commentators make it out to be.87
IV. COPYRIGHT DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO THE INTERMEDIATE COPYIST
Some have argued intermediate copying should not constitute
copyright infringement because the copyright policy of idea dissemination
will not allow for such a result.88  However, to dispose of a claim of
infringement on policy grounds is tenuous, especially given the clarity of
the exclusive right of reproduction provided by § 106(1).89 That clarity
means that a software copyright holder can likely establish a prima facie
case of copyright infringement against the intermediate copyist.
Intermediate copyists however, still possess many defenses that can be
successful against a copyright infringement claim.
As previously noted, some courts have missed the mark by lumping
their sense of fairness and copyright policy into analyses of intermediate
83. Brian C. Behrens & Reuven R. Levary, Legal Aspects-Software Reverse Engineering
and Copyright: Past, Present, and Future, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 16 (1997); see also DSC
Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
84. See Mills, supra note 12; see also supra notes 12 & 17 and accompanying text.
85. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526. Use of a clean room procedure would not have absolved
the defendant from infringement, because "the use of a clean room would not have avoided the
need for disassembly because disassembly was necessary in order to discover the functional
specifications for a Genesis-compatible game." Id.
86. Davis, supra note 11, at 152-53.
87. But see Behrens & Levary, supra note 83, at 15-16 (concluding the clean room
process "ensures clean hands"). However, employment of clean room procedures might inhibit
the ability of the copyright holder to seek an injunction, and could also affect the quantum of
damages.
88. See Davis, supra note 11, at 153.
89. See White-Smith Music Publ'g. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (noting copyright's exclusive rights "hardly can be conceived except as a product of
statute").
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copyists' infringement. While this approach might lead to a desirable
outcome in a given case, it improperly mixes consideration of a plaintiffs
prima facie infringement claim and an intermediate copyist's defense,
thereby clouding what should be a crisp boundary between the two.90
Courts would instead be wise in a typical case to first find infringement of
the author's reproduction right under § 106(1) and then proceed to analyze
the intermediate copyist's defenses. Some of these defenses are
particularly strong in a typical case of intermediate copying.
A. Intermediate Copying of Software Can Be a Fair Use
As previously noted, the Copyright Act does not contain a provision
that clearly exempts the intermediate copyist from infringement liability.
However, the Copyright Act's "fair use" provision has proven to be an
adequate, albeit more vague, substitute. This provision provides
"[n]otwithstanding [an author's exclusive rights], the fair use of a
copyrighted work... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching.... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright," and lists four non-exclusive factors a court should consider in
making this determination. 9'
The leading case applying fair use in the context of intermediate
copying is Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.92 In Sega, Accolade sought
90. This point was correctly recognized by the district court in Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000):
Cormectix argues that it had to copy and run the entire Sony BIOS "to understand"
and "to study" the BIOS' functional elements. This argument is misplaced in the
present step in the analysis. That is, Connectix' reasons for its copying and use of
the Sony BIOS involve an alleged defense, which only becomes relevant in the
later "fair use" defense analysis.
Id. at 1218.
91. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994) (emphasis added). In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include the following:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
92. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). However, an important case which preceded Sega was
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), a case also involving
the reverse engineering of games cartridges and assessing intermediate copying as fair use. The
Sega court was cognizant that the Atari court had already addressed the fair use point and noted
that Atari was "consistent both with our analysis and the result we reach." Sega Enters. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 n.l (9th Cir. 1992). However, Atari's discussion of fair use
will not be set forth in this article for two reasons. First, as the Sega court made clear, much of its
discussion parallels that of the Atari court and second, the facts of Atari are complicated by the
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to make video game cartridges compatible with Sega's game console, and
used reverse engineering to discover the elements in the programming
necessary to make compatible cartridges.93  In doing so, Accolade
disassembled Sega's object code and created copies of the source code.
Sega contended the creation of the source code through disassembly
constituted infringement. The Ninth Circuit agreed,94 but concluded
Accolade's intermediate copying was fair use. The court stated:
In light of the public policies underlying the Act, we conclude
that, when the person seeking [an understanding of the
unprotected functional elements of a program] has a legitimate
reason for doing so and when no other means of access to the
unprotected elements exists, such disassembly is as a matter of
law a fair use of the copyrighted work.
95
The court determined the first, second and fourth fair use factors
weighed in Accolade's favor. With regard to the first factor, the purpose
and character of the use, the court paid heed to the principle that copying
for a commercial purpose is presumptively not fair.96 The court, however,
determined because Accolade's use was intermediate-involving only an
indirect commercial exploitation of "minimal significance" 9 7-- this use
rebutted the presumption of unfairness. The court considered Accolade's
use to be a non-commercially-motivated desire to understand the
unprotectable aspects of Sega's game cartridges.98 The court further
fact that Atari's counsel procured a copy of Nintendo's program from the Copyright Office
through false statements, and Atari thus used an "unauthorized copy" in their reverse engineering
efforts. Thus, while Atari's "'reverse engineering' process, to the extent untainted by the [copy
of Nintendo's software] purloined from the Copyright Office, qualified as fair use... [b]ecause
Atari was not in authorized possession of the Copyright Office copy of [Nintendo's software],
any copying.., does not qualify as fair use." Atari, 975 F.2d at 843-44 (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 439, 562-63 (1985) for the proposition that
"[k]nowing exploitation of [a] purloined manuscript [is] not compatible with 'good faith' and
'fair dealings' underpinnings of fair use doctrine").
93. See Sega, 977 F.2dat 1514-15.
94. See id. at 1518; see also discussion supra Part lII.B.
95. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
96. See id. at 1522 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562). The Supreme Court has
recently retreated from a strict application of this presumption. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (stating when evaluating the first factor, courts should
undertake a fact-specific analysis rather than "elevating commerciality to hard presumptive
significance"); see also Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,
606 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Since Sega . . . the Supreme Court has rejected [the commerciality]
presumption as applied to the first and fourth factor[s] of the fair use analysis. Instead the fact
that Connectix's copying of the Sony BIOS was for a commercial purpose is only a 'separate
factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."' (citation omitted)).
97. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-23.
98. See id.
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considered Sega's use to provide a public benefit in the dissemination of
other creative works, a policy generally fostered by the Copyright Act.
99
As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court
noted computer programs were utilitarian and therefore entitled to less
protection than other works, such as works of fiction, whose copyrights are
not as thin.'00 The court also found it significant that the unprotectable
elements of computer programs cannot feasibly be studied by means other
than disassembly, which is not practical without concurrently making a
copy of the source code. 1 1
The third factor, the amount of the copyrighted work appropriated,
was the only factor the court found to weigh in Sega's favor, because
Accolade had disassembled Sega's entire code. However, the court was
quick to point out this did not militate against a finding of fair use and
carried little weight when the copying was merely intermediate. 1
02
As to the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the market for the
copyrighted work, the court noted Accolade had not copied Sega's
expression and marketed that expression in order to capture Sega's
markets. Instead, Accolade was merely attempting to establish itself as a
legitimate competitor in the Sega-compatible game cartridge market. Even
though Accolade's use indirectly affected the market for Sega-compatible
games, Accolade's use would not likely displace Sega's games in the
market because players would probably play both Sega's and Accolade's
games even if the games dealt with the same general subject matter. 103 The
court also observed Sega's attempt to foreclose competition in the Sega-
compatible game market "runs counter to the statutory purpose of
promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable
basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine." 1 4
The court, in summary, noted its conclusion concerning fair use was
consistent with the copyright policy of idea dissemination and the
99. See id. at 1523 (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)).
100. See id. at 1524; see also Sony Computer, 203 F.3d at 603 ("Sony's BIOS lies at a
distance from the core [of intended copyright protection] because it contains unprotected aspects
that cannot be examined without copying. We consequently accord it a 'lower degree of
protection than more traditional literary works."' (citation omitted)).
101. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-26.
102. See id. at 1526-27.
103. Id. at 1523 (noting "a consumer particularly interested in sports might purchase both
Accolade's 'Mike Ditka Power Football' and Sega's 'Joe Montana Football,' particularly if the
games are, as Accolade contends, not substantially similar").
104. Id. at 1524.
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stimulation of "artistic creativity for the general public good."'10 5 Further,
the court found its conclusion particularly sound, in light of the fact that the
unprotectable elements buttressing Sega's protectable expression were not
readily observable without engaging in reverse engineering. Therefore,
according to the court, a failure to find fair use would erroneously give
Sega a "de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts"' 1 6 the
Copyright Act relegates to the public domain.
The Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed the holding of Sega in Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.10 7 As noted previously in
connection with an analysis of the district court's infringement
determination,10 8 defendant Connectix built an emulator that allowed its
customers to play Sony's video game cartridges on their personal
computers. 10 9 To build the emulator, Connectix had to make a copy of the
BIOS software in Sony's PlayStation game console."0 Sony alleged the
intermediate copying of its BIOS code was an infringement and requested a
preliminary injunction."' The district court granted the preliminary
injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on the ground
the intermediate copying constituted a fair use under Sega.
The Ninth Circuit's fair use analysis in Sony Computer largely
parallels that of Sega. However, the analysis was updated to take into
account whether the intermediate copying gave rise to a new work that was
"transformative," i.e., whether the new work "merely supercedes the
objects of the original creation or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message." ' 1 2 The Sony Computer court considered
Connectix's virtual game station to be "modestly transformative" because it
offered a new platform on which to play Sony's games, and more
importantly because it constituted a "wholly new product" when compared
with anything Sony had manufactured. 1 3 The transformative nature of
Connectix's copying worked in Connectix's favor in the court's assessment
of the first and fourth statutory factors-the purpose and character of
105. Id. at 1527 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984)).
106. Id.
107. 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
108. See supra Part III.A.
109. Sony Computer, 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. See id.
111. See id.




Connectix's use of Sony's software and the effect of the use upon Sony's
potential market."14
As in Sega, the Sony Computer court recognized the heart of the case
concerned the right of Connectix to learn from those aspects of Sony's
software beyond the ambit of copyright and which could not be discovered
through means other than copying."15 The court thus held that Connectix's
intermediate copying of Sony's BIOS software constituted fair use as a
matter of law, and admonished Sony that if it wished "to obtain a lawful
monopoly on the functional concepts in its software, it must satisfy the
more stringent standards of the patent laws.""
6
Sega and Sony Computer provide powerful protection for the
intermediate copyist. The intermediate copyist, by definition, embarks on
copying for the purpose of understanding and utilizing a program's
unprotectable elements-a "legitimate reason" under Sega. Furthermore,
the intermediate copyist usually must copy and disassemble a protected
software work in order to gain access to its unprotected elements. Under
these typical circumstances, fair use attaches as a matter of law, at least in
the Ninth Circuit.''
7
Because fair use operates as an "equitable rule of reason,"" 8 it is
difficult to predict how a court will apply it in a given case of intermediate
copying. However, several generalizations can be drawn from Sega, Sony
Computer and other cases that flesh out the scope of fair use. First, if the
intermediate copyist's use is highly transformative because it gives rise to
new expression that enriches the public,' 9 it will more likely rebut the
presumption of unfairness raised by the commercial motives of the
intermediate copyist. 120  Thus, the intermediate copyist, by virtue of the
creation of a new work not substantially similar to the copied work, is more
likely to find solace in fair use than will infringers whose works
incorporate substantial amounts of protected expression, 2' or whose use of
114. See id. at 606-09. Concerning the fourth statutory factor, the court noted "[w]hereas
a work that merely supplants or supercedes another is likely to cause a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market of the original, a transformative work is less likely to do so." Id.
at 607.
115. See id. at 602.
116. Id. at 605.
117. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
118. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
119. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (noting "the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.").
120. See id.
121. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843 ("Subparagraphs 1 and 4 of section 107 clarify the fair use
in intermediate copying does not extend to commercial exploitation of protected expression.");
Davidson, supra note 77, at 6 ("There is a significant difference between the copying of creative
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another's software is not used in the creation of a new work. 122 Second,
courts will be reluctant to find fair use if the intermediate copyist has
engaged in bad faith, for example, by procuring a copy of the protected
work through illegal or unfair means. 123 Third, while the application of fair
use presupposes the appropriation of some protected expression,
appropriation of a software work whose protection is thin will more
strongly favor a finding of fair use. 12 4  Fourth, fair use is more likely to
attach if the intermediate copyist labors to achieve interoperability with
another software product and if achieving such interoperability is not
practical through other means. 1
2 5
expression of a copyrighted work for the purpose of having that precise form of expression
advance someone else's commercial interests and copying for the purpose of using the content of
the work to advance that person's commercial interests. The latter is recognized as being much
more conducive to fair use." (citing Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983))).
122. In Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), the
Ninth Circuit determined copying the plaintiffs software into RAM by an organization that
serviced the plaintiff's computers was not a fair use. The court distinguished its decision in Sega
on the basis here defendant Southeastern created nothing of its own. Id. at 1336. "Southeastern
is simply commandeering its customers' software and using it for the very purpose for which, and
in precisely the manner in which, it was designed to be used." Id. at 1337. Likewise, the Federal
Circuit in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
1999), in discussing the dismissal of defendant Pulsecom's fair use defense, concluded
defendant's use of the plaintiff s work was not to discover how the product operated but "merely
to demonstrate the interchangeability" of defendant's product with plaintiffs. Pulse
Communications, 170 F.3d at 1363; see also Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908
F. Supp. 1409, 1420 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
In contrast, Procom's use of Compaq's threshold values was not an intermediate
use, intended to facilitate the study of functional aspects of CIM. As in Sega, Pro-
com made a verbatim copy of the copyrighted material. However, Procom never
used the copy to develop its own, noninfringing product. Instead Procom simply
reproduced the copied data onto its own drives to achieve interoperability. In addi-
tion, Procom, unlike Accolade, avoided performing its own creative work by sim-
ply copying the material from Compaq. Under the logic of Sega, the court should
focus on the particular use of the copied material. Accordingly, the first statutory
factor weighs in favor of Compaq because the particular use was also the ultimate
use and the ultimate use was clearly commercial.
Id.
123. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843; see also supra note 92; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562
("Fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' (citations and quotations omitted)).
124. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524.
125. EC Directive on the Protection of Computer Software, art. 6 (1992) [hereinafter
Accord Directive]. The Accord Directive allows "decompilation" under the following
circumstances: "where... reproduction of the code and translation of its form... are
indispensable to obtain necessary information to achieve the interoperability of an independently
created program with other programs." Id. "Interoperability" is defined as "the ability to
exchange information and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged." Davis,
supra note 11, at 149 (noting the EC Software Directive's use of the terms "decompilation" is
misleading, because "it purports to describe a process that does not exist") "There is presently no
known way to decompile a program." Id. Instead, Davis asserts the EEC Directive intends to
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B. Those Who Assert Their Software Copyrights Against Intermediate
Copyists Can Be Misusers
126
A copyright holder who wishes to sue an intermediate copyist should
be especially careful not to overstep the bounds of his copyright or the
holder may find the suit jeopardized by a finding of misuse. Misuse, 127 a
judicial doctrine, arises when a holder of an intellectual property right uses
that right to obtain or coerce an unfair commercial advantage beyond the
scope of the right. 128 If the alleged infringer is able to show misuse, the
right is held unenforceable until the anticompetitive effect of the misuse
has been purged.
129
One of the leading cases prescribing the scope of the misuse doctrine
is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. 130  In that case, patentee Morton
cover "disassembly," and the term "decompilation" arose from the translation of the Directive
from French to English. Id.
126. Activities that give rise to a misuse defense can also act as a predicate for an antitrust
counterclaim by the alleged infringer. In this sense, an antitrust counterclaim, with its threat of
treble damages, can also be an important defensive measure for the intermediate copyist to
employ, even though it requires proof beyond the misuse. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) ("Consistent with our cases, it is generally required that to
demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged
in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."). However, this "defense" is not addressed
in this article because it is beyond its scope. For other articles discussing antitrust in the reverse
engineering context, see David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age:
Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 771 (1996); Robert H. Lande & Sturgis M. Sobin, Reverse Engineering of Computer
Software and U.S. Antitrust Law, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1996). See generally Lasercomb
Am. Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing the differences between
copyright misuse and antitrust).
127. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Copyright misuse is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.").
128. See, e.g., Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999);
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing misuse in the
patent context). It should be noted the patent law contains certain statutory exceptions to misuse.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
129. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (noting a
misuser cannot sue for infringement of its patent "until it is made to appear that the improper
practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been
dissipated"); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass'n., 121 F.3d 516, 520 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1997) ("Copyright misuse does not invalidate a copyright, but precludes its enforcement
during the period of misuse."); C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372.
130. 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 224-30 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the development of the misuse doctrine
and citing Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)
[hereinafter Mercoid 11], Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)
[hereinafter Mercoid 1], B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (Morton Salt's companion
case), Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
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Salt entered into license agreements that required the licensees of its salt
dispensing machines to buy only Morton's unpatented salt tablets. When
Morton Salt sued G.S. Suppiger for infringement of its patent, the Court
was forced to grapple with the question of "whether a court of equity
[would] lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when [Morton Salt]
[was] using it as a means of restraining competition with its sale of an
unpatented article."'' The Supreme Court answered the question in the
negative, dismissed the suit, and noted where a patent is used to restrain
competition with an unpatented product, it undermines the "public policy
underlying the grant of the patent."'' 3 2 It was irrelevant to the Court's
holding G.S. Suppiger was not harmed by the misuse' 33 or a violation of
the antitrust laws was not shown.
134
Although the Court hinted the same rules would apply in the
Copyright context,3 5 subsequent case law applying copyright misuse [was]
sparse 136 until the Fourth Circuit decided Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 137 in 1990. In Lasercomb, the defendant, a licensee of plaintiff's
copyrighted software, made and distributed copies of the software in
violation of its license. Despite its obvious infringement, the defendant
asserted that plaintiff misused its copyright by including terms in its
licenses that precluded its licensees from creating software which competed
with the plaintiffs for the next 100 years. The Fourth Circuit agreed and
concluded the plaintiffs licensing provisions "control[led] competition in
an area outside [of its] copyright,"' 38 which was contrary to public policies
underlying copyright law.
Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931), Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502
(1917)).
131. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
132. Id. at 493; see also Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 520 ("[W]e conclude the AMA
misused its copyright by licensing the CPT to HCFA in exchange for HCFA's agreement not to
use a competing coding system.").
133. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 ("It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of
a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which
disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suffered
from the misuse of the patent.").
134. See id. ("It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the Clayton
Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of the present suit to restrain petitioner's
manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and that the
district court rightly dismissed the complaint for want of equity.").
135. See id. (citing cases noting the "application of the like doctrine in the case of
copyright").
136. See generally M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948)
(finding copyright misuse).
137. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
138. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Lasercomb paved the way for DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI
Technologies, Inc.,139 an important case applying copyright misuse
principles in the intermediate copying context. In DSC Communications,
DGI wished to manufacture microprocessor cards that could be used in
DSC's telephone switching system. To do so, DGI needed to download
DSC's operating system software into the RAM memory on its cards to
verify their compatibility with DSC's system. DGI accomplished this
necessary testing by entering into an agreement with NTS, a purchaser of
DSC's switching equipment and licensee of DSC's software.14° DSC
asserted the testing arrangement was beyond the scope of its license with
NTS, which prohibited using licensed software with hardware not
manufactured by DSC, and thus constituted copyright infringement.1
4
1
Citing Lasercomb and Morton Salt as authority, the Fifth Circuit suggested
DSC was likely guilty of misuse, having endeavored to use its copyright to
obtain "patent-like monopoly over unpatented microprocessor cards."'
142
The court thus refused to expand the limited preliminary injunction entered
by the district court. 143 In support of its conclusion, the court noted:
Any competing microprocessor card developed for use on DSC
phone switches must be compatible with DSC's copyrighted
operating system software. In order to ensure that its card is
compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test the card on a
DSC phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making a
copy of DSC's copyrighted operating system, which copy is
downloaded into the card's memory when the card is booted up.
If DSC is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent
anyone from developing a competing microprocessor card, even
though it has not patented the card. The defense of copyright
misuse forbids the use of the copyright to secure an exclusive
right or limited monopoly not granted by the [copyright law],
including a limited monopoly over microprocessor cards.144
139. 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
140. In exchange for allowing DGI to test its cards, DGI promised to give NTS a ten
percent discount in its cards once they were developed. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI
Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
141. See id. at 597-600.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 599-600 (indicating under the district court's injunction, "DGI could not
continue to make copies of the operating system to take back to its lab and study, but it could test
its microprocessor card on [the third party's] phone switch,'even though DSC's operating system
software would be downloaded into the microprocessor card's RAM.").
144. Id. at 601.
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On appeal, after remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its previous reasoning
concerning misuse, and held a permanent injunction could not be entered
against DGI. 1
45
Other appellate cases addressing the propriety of intermediate
copying further illustrate the operation of copyright misuse in this context.
For example, in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 46 the Ninth Circuit
hinted at possible misuse implications. In discussing the fourth fair use
factor, the court found Sega's "attempt to monopolize the market by
making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine."'
' 47
Under the second fair use factor, the court expressed concern because
unprotectable elements of Sega's program could only be investigated
through disassembly. The court noted if disassembly was considered per se
unfair, the copyright owner would in effect gain a monopoly over the
functional aspects of his work, which were only properly protected under
patent law. 148 Thus, inasmuch as Sega's complaint attempted to control
activities beyond the scope of its copyright, its infringement allegations
ostensibly could have been successfully rebutted by a misuse defense.
A circuit split exists on the question whether a defendant asserting the
equitable defense of copyright misuse must come to court with clean hands.
This issue usually arises when the intermediate copyist procured a copy of
plaintiff's work by questionable means.149 At one end of the spectrum is
the Federal Circuit's ruling in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc.' 50  In Atari, the Federal Circuit entertained Atari's assertion that
Nintendo's copyright licenses, which purported to give Nintendo effective
control over independent works created by licensees, constituted misuse.
15'
Noting Atari purloined a copy of Nintendo's program through
misrepresentations to the Copyright Office, the court denied Atari
entitlement to the defense. 5 2  Because the defense was an equitable
doctrine, Atari needed 'clean hands'.153
145. See Alcatel U.S.A., Inc, v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 794 (5th Cir. 1999).
146. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
147. Id. at 1523-24.
148. See id. at 1526; see also Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203
F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting patent law, not copyright law, was the proper vehicle for
obtaining a "lawful monopoly on the functional concepts" embodied in software).
149. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
150. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).




The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in Alcatel US.A., Inc. v.
DGI Technologies, Inc. 154 In Alcatel, the post-trial sequel to DSC, the Fifth
Circuit concluded DGI could assert a misuse defense even though DGI had
unclean hands. The court distinguished Atari and other cases as
"unpersuasive." 155
Under normal circumstances, copyright misuse has special potency
with respect to computer software copyrights, especially in the intermediate
copying context. As noted above, computer software is utilitarian and
generally contains an intermingling of expression and other non-protectable
elements. A copyright holder waiting to sue an intermediate copyist is in a
dilemma because the copyright only extends to expression. A copyright
holder must be careful to couch the complaint in such a way that does not
effectively proscribe conduct beyond the scope of copyright. This becomes
difficult when the intermediate copyist copies software in pursuit of legal
endeavors such as understanding a program's unprotectable features.
Copyright holders should also scour their existing licensing agreements to
ensure they do not include terms that overstep bounds of the rights afforded
by copyright. 1
56
To make matters worse for the copyright holder, case law from the
patent arena suggests limiting reverse engineering by license could
constitute misuse as well. 57  In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., a
patent holder stamped his patented medical device "for single use only.'
159
The defendant collected and refurbished spent devices and sold them. The
patentee sued the defendant for inducement of infringement, asserting the
use restriction constituted a "label license."'160  The defendant countered,
asserting the use restriction constituted misuse. The Federal Circuit
concluded the enforceability of the licensing restriction would be judged
154. 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
155. Alcatel US.A., 166 F.3d at 794-95. Among those "unpersuasive" cases was Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). "[I]f copyright misuse
is an equitable defense, a defendant that has itself acted inequitably may not be entitled to raise
such a defense." Id. at 1170 n.43; see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[B], at 13-295 (1999) (suggesting the defense of unclean hands should
possibly be denied "when the defendant has been guilty of conduct more unconscionable and
unworthy than the plaintiffs").
156. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359,
363 (E.D. Va. 1997) (involving a claim by DSC that its software license agreements with its
customers prohibited downloading the software into cards that were not made or licensed by
DSC).
157. For more about licensing restrictions against reverse engineering of software, see
infra Part V.
158. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
159. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
160. See id. at 703.
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according to the rule of reason.1 61 A misuse defense required a factual
determination the "overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition
unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market."'' 62  A misuse
would have occurred, the court continued, if the patent holder had gone
beyond the patent and "into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not
justifiable under the rule of reason."'' 63 The court reversed the summary
judgment granted in favor of the defendant and remanded the case to the
district court to make this determination in the first instance.'
64
Because licensing restrictions prohibiting reverse engineering are not
per se illegal, their enforceability is presumably governed according to the
rule of reason under Mallinckrodt. If the copyright holder cannot establish
a legitimate reason for the prohibition against reverse engineering, the
infringement suit might be jeopardized as an anticompetitive attempt to
prohibit development of new software products.
To summarize, there are several ways a copyright holder could be
deemed to have misused the copyright in the context of intermediate
copying. This defense will certainly become commonly asserted in such
suits in the future.
C. Section 117: A Safe-Haven for the Intermediate Copyist?
Section 117 of the Copyright Act seems to provide an intermediate
copyist with refuge from liability. The section provides in relevant part:
[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make... another copy.., of that computer program
provided:
(1) that such a new copy ... is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner ....
(2) that such new copy... is for archival purposes
only .... 165
An intermediate copy is not made for archival purposes, but is it
"created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program?"' 66
It is useful to turn to the legislative history of § 117 to attempt to answer
this question. Courts have generally treated CONTU's Final Report as
161. See id.
162. Id. at 706.
163. Id. at 708.
164. See id. at 709.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
166. Id.
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reflecting Congressional intent because the legislative history of § 117
demonstrates an intent to incorporate CONTU's conclusions. 167 This report
provides in relevant part:
One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program... should be
provided with a legal right to copy it to the extent which will
permit its use by that possessor. This would include the right to
load it into a computer and to prepare archival copies of it to
guard against destruction or damage .... But this permission
would not extend to other copies of the program. 1
68
CONTU's Final Report thus recognizes certain copies which are
necessarily incident to the use of the program, such as intracomputer copies
generated by use or archival copies, are exempt from infringement. 1
69
However, an intermediate copy generated during reverse engineering
is neither an intracomputer copy nor an archival copy. Instead, the use of
an intermediate copy seems to be precluded by the "use in no other
manner" language of the statute, and there is no support in CONTU's Final
Report to the contrary. 170 To summarize, the CONTU Final Report does
not support the proposition that an intermediate copy constitutes a copy
made "as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program."
Indeed, CONTU's conclusion that computer software should enjoy
copyright protection 171 supports the proposition that the excepted uses of §
117 should not be read broadly.
Despite CONTU's ostensibly clear intention, the circuit courts are
split on whether § 117 shelters the intermediate copyist from liability. In
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,72 defendant Quaid purchased a copy
of Vault's anti-copying software and studied it to create a program to
167. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The
Act's legislative history, contained in a short paragraph in a committee report, merely states that
the Act, 'embodies the recommendations of [the CONTU] with respect to clarifying the law of
copyright of computer software.' The absence of an extensive legislative history and the fact that
Congress enacted proposed section 117 with only one change have prompted courts to rely on the
CONTU Report as an expression of legislative intent." (citations and footnote omitted)).
168. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 13 (Dept. of Commerce, July 31, 1978) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
169. See id. In enacting the new § 117, Congress adopted the proposed section with only
one change. The final version grants 'owners,' as opposed to 'rightful possessors,' a limited right
to copy and adapt their software. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, 170
F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
170. See generally CONTU FINAL REPORT; Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d at 1359.
171. See CONTU FINAL REPORT at 11 ("The cost of developing computer programs is far
greater than the cost of their duplication... [S]ome form of protection is necessary to encourage
the creation and broad distribution of computer programs in a competitive market.").
172. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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defeat the operation of Vault's software. Quaid loaded Vault's program
into the RAM on its computer, an act which Vault asserted was
infringement. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, and concluded § 117 protected
Quaid's activities even though Quaid's copy of Vault's program was made
expressly to devise a means of defeating its protective function. 173  The
court determined the copy made by Quaid was "created as an essential step
in the utilization" of Vault's program.' 74  The court declined to accept
Vault's argument the "use[ ] in no other manner" language in § 117
warranted an interpretation that would "permit only the copying of a
computer program for the purpose of using it for its intended purpose."'
175
The Vault decision has been sharply criticized as an overbroad reading of §
1 17(l)'s use exception.1
76
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Sega discounted Accolade's
arguments that its intermediate copy was entitled to § 117 protection, and
noted "it [was] clear that Accolade's use went far beyond that contemplated
by CONTU and authorized by section 117. "I77 According to the court,
"[s]ection 117 does not ... protect a user who disassembles object code,
converts it from assembly into source code, and makes printouts and
photocopies of the refined source code version."'
' 78
An interesting case from the Federal Circuit may influence the
interpretation given to § 117 in the context of intermediate copying of
software. In DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,
Inc.,179 defendant Pulse manufactured cards for use in DSC's switching
system, which it tested on a DSC system it procured on the open market.' 80
173. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520 n.6 (declining to address this issue).
176. See JOYCE, supra note 40, at 468 (describing Vault as an "expanded (if not
exploded)" reading of§ 1 17(1)'s utilization exception to copyright infringement).
177. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520.
178. Id.; see also Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Sega); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (taking a narrow view of what constitutes permissible use under § 117 after
reviewing the CONTU Final Report); cf Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance,
Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450, 456 (D. Idaho 1983) (inferring § 117 does not provide protection for the
intermediate copyist).
179. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
180. See Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d at 1363. Pulse also tested its cards on the DSC
systems of other third parties, and DSC asserted this activity constituted contributory
infringement. The district court disagreed, and concluded § 117 insulated the third parties (and
therefore, Pulse) from infringement. The court first opined the "trend is to read Section 117
broadly," (citation omitted), and because the third parties were "owners" of copies of DSC's
software they were entitled to download the software into Pulse's cards as an "essential step" in
the utilization of the program. Pulse Communications, 976 F. Supp. at 362-63. The Federal
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DSC asserted Pulse infringed its software copyright when the software in
DSC's system was downloaded into Pulse's cards during the testing
procedure.' 8 1 The Federal Circuit concluded, without discussion, Pulse was
"entitled, under 17 U.S.C. § 117, to make such copies of the... [software]
as were necessary to operate the system."' 82  It is worth noting, Pulse
Communications does not present the type of intermediate copying that has
been the focus of this Article. The copying was not made for the purposes
of understanding the unprotectable elements therein and designing a new
piece of software, but rather to test the compatibility of Pulse's hardware
with DSC's. However, the Federal Circuit's cursory conclusion that
Pulse's "non-standard" use of DSC's software was entitled to § 117
protection may influence a conclusion that any use of software, including
intermediate copying, is similarly protected.
Thus, whether intermediate copying comes within the scope of § 117
is not well-settled in the circuit courts. While CONTU's Final Report
suggests intermediate copies are not one of the narrow categories of copies
protectable under § 117, an intermediate copyist will argue to the contrary
and may be successful outside of the Ninth Circuit.
V. THE IMPACT OF LICENSE RESTRICTIONS
Software is generally not sold but licensed to end users.'83 This is
usually accomplished by a "shrinkwrap" license in which the end user is
deemed to manifest assent to the licensing terms printed on the software's
packaging by removing its plastic (shrinkwrap). 184  Because of the
Circuit reversed and remanded this determination on the ground that the third parties were not
"owners," but mere licensees, of the software and therefore not entitled to the protection of § 117.
See Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d at 1362.
181. See Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d at 1363. DSC also asserted Pulse directly
infringed when it created copies on the systems of the third parties. The Federal Circuit, relying
on its resolution of DSC's contributory infringement claim also remanded for a determination of
DSC's direct liability. See id. at 1362-63; supra note 180.
182. Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d at 1363.
183. See Leonard T. Nuara, Software Litigation and Software Licensing: Don't Draw,
Draft!, 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 15, 17 (1997). The purpose of licensing software, as opposed to
selling it, is to avoid the First Sale doctrine which allows buyers to freely resell, copy or
otherwise dispose of purchased software. A license, by its terms, can limit the ability of a
licensee to engage in such activity, thereby increasing the licensor's control over disposition of its
products. See Darren C. Baker, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in
Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92
Nw. U. L. REv. 379, 393 (1997) [hereinafter ProCD Note]; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
184. See Note, Shrinkwrap Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 839, 839-41 (1997) [hereinafter Breaking the Seal].
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copyright holder's desire to retain some degree of control over the use of
the work, shrinkwrap licenses typically prohibit reverse engineering as a
permissible use. 85 Accordingly, the intermediate copyist might be liable
for copyright infringement because the creation of an intermediate copy is
generally outside the scope of the license.
186
The copyright holder can alternatively sue for breach of the
shrinkwrap license. 87  The question then arises whether copyright
defenses, including fair use, misuse and perhaps § 117, can be nullified if
the copyright holder asserts a breach of license claim instead of a copyright
infringement claim. The answer to this question is unclear'8 8 and turns on
the resolution of two issues, the extent to which shrinkwrap licenses are
enforceable and the extent to which a cause of action for breach of license
is preempted by the copyright laws.
A. Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licenses Under State Law:
Courts assessing the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses have been
divided. Some courts have held shrinkwrap licenses are unenforceable as
Purchasers of mass produced software encounter shrinkwrap licenses as the list of
fine print terms expressed in complicated legalese which the user is expected to
read (though more likely will ignore) prior to using the product. Often, the terms
are printed on an envelope within the actual purchased package which contains the
software diskettes. The user may constructively assent to these terms by opening
the flap of the envelope. Another way a purchaser can consent to the licensing
terms is by breaking a plastic seal which tightly fits the software package, hence the
name "shrinkwrap."
Id.; see also Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr. Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 1218, 1230 n.16 (D. Utah
1997). A type of shrinkwrap license that is becoming more common is the "clickwrap license,"
in which the licensee manifests his assent to the license terms by clicking a button on the
computer screen prior to accessing the licensed work. See generally Stomp, Inc. v. Neato, LLC,
61 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080-81 n.l 1 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
185. See ProCD Note, supra note 183, at 391 (noting the following typical software
shrinkwrap license terms: "(1) a statement of proprietary rights and prohibition against
unauthorized copies, (2) prohibition of rental of the software, (3) prohibition on reverse
engineering and modifications to the software, (4) restrictions regarding permissible use of the
software, (5) disclaimer of warranties, and (6) limitation of liability." (emphasis added)).
186. See Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976).
187. See Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967-68 (4th Cir. 1990).
This assumes the license is not a mere license, but also includes an express promise by the
licensee not to engage in activity beyond the scope of the license. Cf Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Genentech, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1531, 1534-35 (S.D. Ind. 1990). A license is merely a promise
not to sue for infringement. Therefore, activity beyond the scope of the license is not actionable
as a breach of contract, absent a promise by the licensee not to engage in such activities. Such a
promise will usually not be implied. See id.
188. See Davidson, supra note 77, at 7 ("[I]t is not yet clear whether a contractual
prohibition against reverse engineering (such as commonly appears in modem software license
agreements) is a lawful and enforceable method of preventing such activity.").
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contracts of adhesion.1 89  One court has held shrinkwrap licenses are
attempted "material alterations" to the terms of licenses formed upon party
performance under section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), and are therefore unenforceable.' 90  Yet another court has
declined to enforce a shrinkwrap license by characterizing the transaction
as a sale, thus entitling the buyer to immunity from the license restrictions
under the "first sale" doctrine. 19' Still other courts have found shrinkwrap
licenses enforceable under Article 2 of the UCC.1
92
Over the last decade, attempts have been made to clarify the extent to
which shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable under state law. The American
Law Institute ("ALl") and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") had been collaborating on drafting a
new Article 2B to the UCC which would govern software sales and
licenses,' 93 but these groups reached an impasse and announced in April,
1999, they were abandoning their UCC effort in favor of a new proposal
called the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA").1
94
The impasse was primarily due to disagreements concerning the
enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses:
The nearly 10-year effort eventually had been seen as biased
toward the software industry, with users feeling left out of the
debate. For example, consumer protection advocates have
slammed the provision that governs shrinkwrap or "click
through" licenses as nothing more than giving total force of law
to take-it-or-leave-it type adhesion contracts.
95
Despite criticism the UCITA is merely a "repackaging" of Article
2B, 196 the NCCUSL voted in July, 1999, to approve the final draft of the
189. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989) (noting Vault
rendered the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses questionable).
190. See Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991); accord
Arizona Retail Sys., v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764--66 (D. Ariz. 1993); see also
ProCD Note, supra note 183, at 399 ("Under Step-Saver, shrinkwrap licenses first brought to the
purchaser's attention subsequent to purchase are not enforceable.").
191. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr. Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 1218, 1230 (D. Utah
1997); see also 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
192. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding a
shrinkwrap license was enforceable against the purchaser when it was noted on the packaging and
referred to the enclosed terms).
193. See Article 2B Effort Divorced From UCC; Groups Agree to Repackage, Change




196. See id. ("[T]he newly dubbed UCITA may meet a chilly reception as well. Except
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UCITA and to present it to the states for adoption. 97  The UCITA
generally validates the typical shrinkwrap license. 98  Under the UCITA,
shrinkwrap licenses fall under the general category of "mass market
licenses."' 99  They are enforceable if the licensee has had a chance to
review its terms and manifest assent thereto by appropriate action.200  The
only express limit on enforceability pertains to unconscionable terms or
those contrary to public policy.20 1  If adopted by the states, the UCITA
would generally render shrinkwrap licenses enforceable under state law,
for a few [non-substantive] revisions.., the new proposed model law will incorporate most, if
not all, of the current 2B draft.").
197. See Commissioners Give Thumbs Up, 5 MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST 1 (1999).
198. See generally ProCD Note, supra note 183, at 426-28 (detailing the historical
development of Article 2B).
199. The UCITA defined "mass market license" as "a standard form that is prepared for
and used in a mass-market transaction." See Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 102(45)
(1999). [hereinafter UCITA]. A "mass-market transaction" is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the general
public as a whole including consumers, under substantially the same terms for the
same information;
(ii) the licensee acquires the information or rights in a retail transaction under terms
and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not: (I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance
or public display of a copyrighted work; (II) a transaction in which the information
is customized or otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee other
than minor customization using a capability of the information intended for that
purpose; (III) a site license; or (IV) an access contract.
Id. § 102(46).
200. See id. § 112. Under UCITA:
(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with knowl-
edge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term to adopt or accept it;
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to know that
the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the conduct or statement that
the person assents to the record or term.
(d) Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be proved in any manner, in-
cluding a showing that a procedure existed by which a person or an electronic agent
must have engaged in the conduct or operations in order to obtain, or to proceed
with use of the information or informational rights....
(e) With respect to an opportunity to review, the following rules apply:
(1) A person has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the record or
term is made available in a manner so that a reasonable person ought to have had it
called to the person's attention and permit review.
(3) If a record or term is available for review only after a person becomes obligated
to pay or begins its performance, the person has an opportunity to review only if:
(A) it had a right to a return if it rejected the record;
(B) the record proposed a modification of contract; [or]




likely chilling the efforts of the intermediate copyist. Until then, the
intermediate copyist may continue to argue shrinkwrap licenses prohibiting
reverse engineering are unenforceable as a matter of state law.
B. Preemption of State Law Breach ofLicense Actions
Assuming shrinkwrap licenses which prohibit reverse engineering
will be enforceable, the copyright policy of idea dissemination will be
jeopardized.2 °2 Accordingly, many commentators have opined enforcement
of licensing prohibitions against reverse engineering of software should be
preempted by the copyright laws.203 These commentators believe such
prohibitions prevent the use of information committed to the public trust by
the copyright laws. Whether an action for breach of license arising from
the intermediate copying of software should be preempted depends on the
operation of constitutional principles.2°
Preemption, a concept anchored in the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution,20 5 takes three forms: explicit preemption, field
preemption and conflict preemption.20 6 Congress has exercised its right to
202. See Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap
Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 599-600 (1997) (noting allowing state law breach
of license actions to enforce licensing prohibitions against reverse engineering would "render[
meaningless the balance struck by the Sega court.").
203. See id. at 598. Contractual prohibitions against reverse engineering of software
"restrict the free flow of information, which is the basis for the creation of new works and the
fostering of creativity." See id.; Davis, supra note 11, at 160-61 ("[C]lauses in agreements, and
certainly in state laws, that purport to prohibit reverse engineering should be prohibited, or at
least severely limited, on the basis that such provisions are preempted by the public policies
behind the Copyright Act.... [T]he strong language of the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats and
Feist would seem to support the... theory that prohibitions against reverse engineering are, or
should be against public policy."); Breaking the Seal, supra note 184, at 867 ("The scope of
Article 2B... appears overly broad. This overbreadth may induce courts to fail to recognize
that.., terms [governing public domain information may] be preempted.").
204. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995) (providing a general
discussion of Federal preemption of shrinkwrap licenses); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private
Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against
Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543 (1992); see also Dennis S. Kajala, Federal
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 531 (1997)
(suggesting a mode of analysis in which "it is the element of actual bargaining that distinguishes a
nonpreempted state contract claim from the preempted nominal 'contract' claim under a
shrinkwrap license.").
205. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
206. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
Our cases have established that state law is pre-empted under the Supremacy
Clause... in three circumstances. First ... pre-emption fundamentally is a ques-
tion of congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known through
explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one. Second, in the absence
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explicitly preempt certain state law actions through the enactment of § 301
of the Copyright Act.207 This statute provides a state court action is
preempted if it vindicates rights equivalent to the exclusive rights provided
by § 106.208 Courts have generally interpreted this provision to mean only
those state actions that contain an "extra element" beyond an infringement,
such as reproduction, distribution, display or performance, will not be
preempted.20 9 Courts also generally require the extra element to make the
state action qualitatively different in nature from a copyright infringement
claim.210
of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in
a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively....
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1331-36 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing preemption in the patent law context), overruled on other
grounds, Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
207. Cf Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376, (not providing for explicit preemption); Hunter
Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1332.
208. Section 301 provides in relevant part:
(a)[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
[of section 106] in works... within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103 ... are governed exclusively by this title. [N]o person is en-
titled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law
or statute of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see also Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding a state law claim is preempted if the subject matter of the action falls within the subject
matter of copyright, and the claim protects rights equivalent to any of the exclusive rights of a
federal copyright).
209. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431
(8th Cir. 1993) ("If an extra element is 'required... in order to constitute a state-created cause of
action, then the right does not lie within the general scope of copyright and there is no
preemption."' (quotations and citations omitted)); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting § 301 preempts only those state law rights that "may be
abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by
federal copyright law."). Professor Nimmer has stated the test for statutory preemption as
follows:
The fact that the state-created right is either broader or narrower than its federal
counterpart will not save it from preemption .... [I]f under state law the act of re-
production, performance, distribution or display ..... will in itself infringe the state
created right, then such right is preempted. But if qualitatively other elements are
required, instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distri-
bution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action, the right
does not lie "within the scope of copyright," and there is no preemption.
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.01[B][1] at 1-12 to 1-13 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
210. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 716-17. "Under this so-called 'extra
element' test, 'a state law claim is not preempted if the "extra element" changes the "nature of the
action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim."' Id. (emphasis
omitted). However, an action 'will not be saved from preemption by elements such as awareness
or intent, which alter "the action's scope but not its nature."' Id. (quoting Mayer v. Josiah
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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No cases have addressed whether an action for breach of license
contains a qualitatively-different extra element in the intermediate copying
context. However, the majority view derived from other contexts suggests
that such an action is not preempted. The rationale of these cases rests on
the conclusion that an action for breach of license requires proof of an extra
element, namely, a promise by the licensee which is not required to
establish infringement liability.21' This view has not been universally
adopted. Some district courts recognize that an action for copyright
infringement is not qualitatively different in nature from a breach of license
action in which the copyright holder contests reproduction, distribution,
display or performance rights beyond the scope of the license.212 In short,
211. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996); Taquino v.
Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control
Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (providing a detailed discussion of the issue);
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also
NIMMER, supra note 168, §1.01[B][1] at 1-12 to 1-13.
212. See American Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 922 F. Supp. 926,
931-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Tlhe Court does not perceive a 'qualitative difference' between
AMCC's breach of contract claim... and its copyright claim .... Rather, it appears clear that the
rights asserted under the contract claim are equivalent to the Copyright Act's exclusive right of
public performance. Accordingly, AMCC's breach of contract claim is preempted." (footnote
omitted)); ProCD, 908 F. Supp. 640, 658-59 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding a claim for breach of a
shrinkwrap licensing agreement was preempted because it was "an attempt to make an end run
around copyright law"), rev 'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolff v. Institute of Elec. & Elecs.
Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In the case at bar, IEEE breached its contract
with plaintiffs, embodied in the stock photo invoice, by infringing plaintiffs' copyright. It is
difficult to see how the resulting claims are qualitatively different. Accordingly the breach of
contract claim is preempted."); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
aJfd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
To the extent plaintiff rests his contract claim not on breach of the terms of the
contract but on Weinstein's having copied his property... it is of course pre-
empted. Plaintiff cannot merely rephrase the same claim citing contract law and
thereby obtain relief equivalent to that which he has failed to obtain under copy-
right law.
Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307.
The foregoing cases should be distinguished from cases in which the license restricts
activity that is not equivalent to copyright's exclusive rights. For example, in National Car
Rental, the Eighth Circuit grappled with the question "whether a limitation on the uses to which a
licensee may put a licensed work are preempted even though those uses do not involve the
exclusive copyright rights." National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431 (emphasis added). Because
copyright law did not provide exclusive rights to the "use" of the copyrighted work, the court
held plaintiffs state law breach of license action was not preempted. See id. at 432 ("Because we
decide that the specific contract right [plaintiff] seeks to enforce is not equivalent to any of the
copyright rights, we do not need to decide whether a breach of contract claim based on a
wrongful exercise of one of the exclusive copyright rights is preempted."); see also Acorn
Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy &
Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("A claim that a defendant made
unauthorized use of copyrightable material falls squarely within § 301 and thus is pre-empted."
(citing Peckarsky v. American Broad. Co., 603 F. Supp. 688, 695-96 (D.D.C. 1984))). However,
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whether explicit preemption precludes state law breach of license actions is
unclear.213
Even if a breach of license action survives explicit preemption under
§ 301 of the Copyright Act, the propriety of the action must survive
constitutional muster under field and conflict preemption. The line
between field and conflict preemption is blurred. In fact, the Supreme
Court has gone so far as to describe field preemption as a subset of conflict
preemption.21 4 Field preemption arises when Congress expresses its intent
that federal law exclusively occupy the field in question. Such an intent is
inferred from pervasive federal regulation or implication of a special
federal interest. 215 Because § 301 allows non-equivalent state law claims to
coexist with federal copyright law, it is difficult to argue Congress intended
to preempt all state law actions regulating copyrightable subject matter by
contract. Moreover, because contract actions have traditionally been
relegated to state control, Congressional intent must be "clear and
manifest" for field preemption to operate, which is not.216 Therefore, it is
unlikely state law breach of license actions are precluded under the
principle of field preemption.217
Instead, the real question is whether conflict preemption precludes
218state law breach of license actions. The sine qua non of conflict
this "wrinkle" should have little applicability to the intermediate copying context. The
contractual right the copyright holders seek to vindicate will usually be the intermediate copyists'
promise not to copy the work for purposes of reverse engineering, conduct clearly within the
scope of copyright's right of reproduction.
213. See O'Rourke, supra note 204, at 519 (noting courts "have not held uniformly that a
breach of contract action is always sufficiently qualitatively different from one in copyright
infringement such that it survives preemption"). It should be noted the legislative history of §
301 is especially unclear concerning the extent to which state law contract actions are preempted
thereunder. See id. at 517-18.
214. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5.
215. See id. at 79.
216. See id. ("'Where ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted' includes
areas that have 'been traditionally occupied by the States,' congressional intent to supersede state
laws must be 'clear and manifest."') (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)) (citations modified).
217. Cf Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1334.
With respect to field pre-emption, Title 35 occupies the field of patent law, not
commercial law between buyers and sellers. Not only does ... precedent show the
substantial difference between the two fields, but it also demonstrates that the
regulation of business affairs is traditionally a matter for state regulation. Hence,
under the Court's preemption jurisprudence, the presumption against preemption
has greater force because of the states' long-standing governance of such affairs.
That reinforced presumption instructs against field preemption.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
218. Cf id. at 1334-35 (noting, in a discussion of whether patent law preempts unfair
competition claims under state law, "rejecting field preemption is the better choice in this context,
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preemption is the preclusion of state laws which "stand[s] as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. ' ' '9 As previously noted, the fair use and misuse doctrines (and
perhaps § 117) promote the federal objectives of disseminating ideas and
ensuring such ideas remain within the scope of the public domain.220
Allowing a copyright holder to vindicate his right through a state law
breach of license action against an intermediate copyist renders these
federal copyright defenses inapplicable and upsets the balance established
in the federal copyright scheme. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue a
state law breach of license action should be preempted because it would
effectively regulate subject matter Congress intends to relegate to the
public domain.221
This conclusion is consistent with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc.,222 a patent case presenting an analogous situation. In Bonito
Boats, the Supreme Court held patent law preempts state law when it
attempts to protect subject matter that federal patent law relegates to the
public domain. 2 3 In striking down a state law prohibiting the copying of
boat hull designs by direct molding, the Court stated "the federal patent
laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all
to use.... [S]tate regulation of intellectual property must yield to the
extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws. 224 Because the state statute at issue "conflict[ed] with the 'strong
federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent
protection,' 225 it was preempted.
The same reasoning should apply to preempt state law breach of
license actions brought against intermediate copyists. 226 In fact, the Court
for conflict preemption is a more precise means of determining which state law [unfair
competition] causes of action are preempted than the blunt tool of field preemption").
219. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)).
220. Other federal law and policy may also strengthen the case for constitutional
preemption in this context. See O'Rourke, supra note 204, at 546 (discussing the notion that
antitrust law prevents a competitor from controlling an "essential facility," and accordingly
contractual provisions against disassembly of "essential" operating systems should not be
enforced).
221. Cf Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) ("The
[subject matter] requirements of patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in
the Patent [and Copyright] Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which
the protection of a federal patent is the exception.").
222. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
223. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 ("States may not offer patent-like protection to
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.").
224. Id. at 151-52.
225. Id. at 168 (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969)).
226. Cf O'Rourke, supra note 204, at 540 ("Bonito Boats strongly suggests that
20001
598 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WRE VIEW [Vol. 20:561
noted direct molding, a form of reverse engineering, would likely spur
technological innovation in the art of boat design:
The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be
an essential part of innovation in the field of hydrodynamic
design. Variations as to size and combination of various
elements may lead to significant advances in the field. Reverse
engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public
domain often leads to significant advances in technology. If
Florida may prohibit this particular method of study and
recomposition of an unpatented article, we fail to see the
principle that would prohibit a State from banning the use of
chromatography in the reconstitution of unpatented chemical
compounds, or the use of robotics in the duplication of
machinery in the public domain.2 7
At least one circuit court has realized the federal policies underlying
the aforementioned copyright defenses228 are of sufficient strength to
preempt a state law breach of license claim against an intermediate copyist.
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,229 the Fifth Circuit held a state
statute permitting a software holder to prohibit decompilation or
disassembly by license touched on an area of federal law and was
preempted. The court reasoned:
[s]ection 117 of the Copyright Act permits an owner of a
computer program to make an adaptation of that program
provided that the adaptation is either "created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine," § 117(1), or "is for archival purpose only," §
1 17(2).3 °
While the Fifth Circuit's preemption analysis is outdated 231 and its
application of § 117 is questionable,232 the court's decision is consistent
prohibitions against decompilation accompanying mass-marketed products, whether enforced as a
matter of state statute or contract law, are preempted under patent law." (emphasis added)).
227. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160.
228. See supra Part IV.
229. 847 F.2d 255 (1988); see also supra notes 172-175, and accompanying text.
230. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
231. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held state laws that merely "touch upon the
area" governed by federal intellectual property law are preempted. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964). However, the Court in Bonito Boats explained those cases should not be read as having
such a broad "preemptive sweep." Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154. As the Court explained, such a
broad preemptive principle could not be properly drawn from the Court's precedent, including
Sears itself. See id. at 154-55. Nonetheless, the Court stated the "Sears Court correctly
concluded that the States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which
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with the notion that allowing breach of license actions would upset the
balance struck by the copyright laws regarding what is protectable and
what is not. The policies supporting fair use and misuse provide even
stronger grounds for preemption because these copyright defenses more
clearly legitimize the activities of the intermediate copyist than do § 117.233
These conclusions about conflict preemption notwithstanding, some
legal precedent suggests that an intermediate copyist facing a breach of
license suit may have difficulty asserting a copyright preemption defense.
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,234 the Seventh Circuit held that an action
brought under a shrinkwrap provision that limited use of the software to
non-commercial purposes was not preempted by copyright law. 235  The
court's analysis focused broadly on whether copyright preempted state
contract law in general, 236 and concluded "a simple two-party contract is
not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright' and therefore may be enforced., 237  This holding has been
criticized as overbroad and lacking a rigorous preemption analysis.238 If it
would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law." Id. at 156. It affirmed the
notion that "the fact that a particular item lies within the subject matter of the federal patent laws
[does not] necessarily preclude the States from offering limited protection which does not
impermissibly interfere with the federal patent scheme." Id. at 165; see also Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("State law is not displaced merely because the
contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to
regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.").
232. See supra Part IV.C.
233. Cf O'Rourke, supra note 204, at 538.
Second and perhaps more importantly, Sega rejected Vault's reliance on § 117 as
sanctioning a right to decompile. Sega's holding was grounded in a more sophisti-
cated understanding of computer technology as well as an examination of the his-
tory behind the enactment of the section. Thus, since Vault, the preemption conflict
has been recharacterized not as a clash between § 117 and private contractual pro-
visions, but between the limited Sega/Atari fair use rights and private contract.
Id.
234. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
235. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
236. See id. at 1454 ("But are rights created by contract 'equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright'? Three courts of appeals have answered 'no.' ... A
copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties;
strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights."' (citations
omitted)).
237. Id. at 1455.
238. See Minassian, supra note 202, at 601-02.
Although the Seventh Circuit warned against the adoption of a rule that anything
with the label "contract" is necessarily outside the preemption clause, the court's
analysis and reasoning inevitably lead to such a conclusion. The court did not fo-
cus its analysis on the specific licensing restriction that ProCD was trying to en-
force. Instead, it took a broader view to determine whether contract rights can be
equivalent to the exclusive rights provided by copyright law.... The conclusion
that it reached is not surprising considering the broad perspective it took in its
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is applied by other circuits without proper scrutiny, it could potentially
harm the intermediate copyist in his effort to establish conflict preemption.
VI. ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY AND THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
Intermediate copyists are often interested in studying another author's
software work for the purpose of developing a program that will function
or "interoperate" with the studied program.239  This situation typically
arises when the intermediate copyist desires to create a piece of application
software that will function with the original author's copyrighted operating
system software.240
Often the copyright holder may wish to prevent others from accessing
the software code so the copyright holder can dominate the application
software market for the operating system.24' In such a case, the copyright
holder may restrict access to its software code through the use of a
password or some other sort of electronic "lock-and-key" scheme. Such
schemes are easy to create and often easy for the intermediate copyist or
other interested party to circumvent.242 Yet, even though an intermediate
analysis. No court would hold that the field of contract law is entirely preempted
by federal intellectual property law. Any court that did so would destroy the estab-
lished and recognized role of state contract law in interpreting licensing agree-
ments. . . . By following the Seventh Circuit's analysis, however, it is hard to
imagine any type of contract that could be preempted by section 301(a) of the
Copyright Act. After ProCD, the mere existence of an enforceable licensing
agreement, regardless of the restrictions it imposes upon the end user, is sufficient
to avoid preemption by copyright law. What the Seventh Circuit seems to have
suggested by its ruling is that the existence of a contract between parties supersedes
the federal copyright system.... However, the creation of a dual copyright-
protection scheme is exactly what Congress intended to eliminate when it created
17 U.S.C. § 301.
Id.
239. See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("Software engineers designing a product that must be compatible with a copyrighted
product frequently must reverse engineer the copyrighted product to gain access to the functional
elements of the copyrighted product.").
240. See generally id.
241. For example, in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., plaintiff Sega attempted to
prevent access to its game console through the use of a "Trademark Security System" or
"TMSS." As explained by the Sega court:
[T]he 'Genesis III' [console] incorporates the licensed TMSS. When a game car-
tridge is inserted, the microprocessor contained in the Genesis III searches the game
program for four bytes of data consisting of the letters 'S-E-G-A' (the 'TMSS ini-
tialization code'). If the Genesis III finds the TMSS initialization code in the right
location, the game is rendered compatible and will operate on the console.
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515.
242. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving
Vault's anti-copying software and Quaid's creation of a program to defeat that software).
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copyist would probably be engaging in a legal pursuit under the copyright
laws, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 243 may, under
certain circumstances, make such circumvention illegal.
The DMCA, signed into law October 28, 1998, was intended to
implement two international treaties, 244 the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty. Both treaties generally require "adequate legal
protection" and "effective legal remedies" against the circumvention of
"technical measures" designed to protect their rights under these treaties or
the Berne Convention.245 In response to this obligation, the DMCA
provides in § 1201 (a)(1)(A) of Title 17 that "[n]o person shall circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected., 246 Through this prohibition, Congress created a new right to
control access to a copyrighted work by a technological measure, the
violation of which is made directly actionable under the DMCA.247 Section
1201 (a)(1)(A) takes effect "at the end of the 2-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this chapter ' 248 on October 28, 2000.
The prohibition against circumvention of protective measures is not
absolute as to the intermediate copyist. The "safe harbor" provision of §
1201(0(1) prescribes:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a
person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a
computer program may circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program
for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements
of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of
an independently created computer program with other
243. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
244. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-845, at 159 (1998).
245. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty ("WIPO"), Dec. 20,
1996, art. 11, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 105-17 (1997); see also WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 18, S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-17 (1997).
246. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
As used in this subsection-(A) to 'circumvent a technological measure' means to
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the author-
ity of the copyright owner; and (B) a technological measure 'effectively controls
access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
247. See id. §§ 1203-1204 (prescribing civil remedies and criminal penalties
respectively).
248. See id. § 1201(a)(1).
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programs, and that have not previously been readily available to
the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such
acts of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement
under this title. 49
The legislative history reveals § 1201(f)(1) was added in response to
concerns that § 1201(a)(1)(A) would inadvertently upset the balance Sega
struck between permissible and impermissible behavior of the intermediate
copyist.2 50 This is not to say § 1201(f)(1) has codified the holding of Sega.
Section 1201(f)(1) merely provides a defense against an alleged violation
of the right of access of § 1201(a)(1)(A). It provides no defense against a
charge of copyright infringement, the issue in Sega.25' However, whether
the intermediate copyist's actions constitute copyright infringement is
relevant to the applicability of § 1201(f)(1), which allows for
circumvention of a technical measure only to the extent the intermediate
copyist's actions "do not constitute infringement under this title.,
252
The text of § 1201(0(1) makes explicit not all intermediate copyists
will fall within the scope of that provision. Section 1201(f)(1) is limited to
the narrow range of circumstances in which circumvention was
accomplished "for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those
elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs, and that
have not previously been readily available to the person engaging in the
circumvention. '' 253 Thus, only a subset of intermediate copyists will enjoy
protection from § 1201(a)(1)(A) liability under § 1201(f)(1). Intermediate
copyists who circumvent a work's protective measures but do not strive to
249. Id. § 1201(f)(1)(A).
250. See The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281
Before the Subcomm. on Telecoms., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. 48-49 (1997) (statement of Walter H. Hinton, Vice President of Storage
Technologies Corp.) ("Although it might not be intended to prevent reverse engineering, hamper
interoperability and curtail competition, that would be the result if H.R. 2281 [an earlier version
of the bill that ultimately passed] were to pass into law in its current form.").
251. Some of the language appearing in the legislative history would suggest the contrary.
See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(11), at 42 (noting that a provision in the Senate's version of the bill, S.
2037, which was ultimately adopted by the House, "explicitly authorize[s] reverse engineering for
purposes of achieving interoperability between computer products"). However, such ambiguous
statements should not overrule the clarity of the text of § 1201(f)(1) itself See, e.g., Ex parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) ("[T]here is no need to refer to the legislative history where the
statutory language is clear. 'The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a
legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly
ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction."' (citing
Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945))).
252. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
253. Id.
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create a new piece of software which will interoperate with that work
should be wary of potential liability under the DMCA.
A full discussion of the impact of the DMCA is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, because not all reverse engineers are absolved from
DMCA liability, it is questionable whether the DMCA has impermissibly
shifted the balance too far in the direction of author's rights and away from
the right of the intermediate copyist to investigate and use unprotectable
subject matter. It would appear that effectively precluding access to such
subject matter flaunts copyright's purpose in the dissemination of ideas.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is always dangerous to make generalizations, especially in an area
of law as unsettled as the foregoing. Nevertheless, the following
conclusions are drawn.
Intermediate copyists in a usual case are likely copyright infringers
because they must necessarily make copies of an original work in violation
of the reproduction right of § 106(1) in order to understand the
unprotectable elements within. However, these intermediate copyists can
call upon several copyright defenses which take on an increased vigor in
the intermediate copying context, including fair use, misuse and perhaps §
117 of the Copyright Act. Even if intermediate copyists can escape
liability for copyright infringement, they may have trouble avoiding
liability under shrinkwrap licenses that prohibit reverse engineering. The
enforceability of such licenses under state law is questionable. Legislative
proposals designed to clarify the matter would generally render such
licenses enforceable, much to the intermediate copyist's chagrin. The
maintenance of a breach of license action might be preempted under § 301
and should probably also be preempted under the principles of conflict
preemption, notwithstanding broad contrary statements from some courts.
Finally, the DMCA will prevent certain intermediate copyists from
circumventing measures designed to protect even unprotectable expression
even if those intermediate copyists do not infringe the protected work.
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